Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

National Advertising Company v. Murray City
Corporation, Gene V. Crawford, Sherry T.
Crawford : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven K. Gordon; Durham Jones and Pinegar; Attorney for Appellants.
Donald L. Dalton; Dalton and Kelley; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, National Advertising Company v. Murray City Corporation, No. 20050110 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5568

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NATIONAL ADVERTISING
COMPANY,

Case No. 20050110-CA
:
Priority No. 15

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
GENE V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T.
CRAWFORD dba "Val-Dev, L.L.C.,"

:
:

Defendants/Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

On Appeal from Judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Presiding

Donald L. Dalton (4305)
DALTON & KELLEY
Post Office Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Telephone: (801)583-2510

Steven K. Gordon (5958)
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000

Attorneys for National
Advertising Company

Attorneys for Gene V. Crawford
and Sherry T. Crawford

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NATIONAL ADVERTISING
COMPANY,

Case No. 20050110-CA
:
Priority No. 15

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
GENE V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T.
CRAWFORD dba "Val-Dev, L.L.C.,"

:
:

Defendants/Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

On Appeal from Judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Presiding

Donald L. Dalton (4305)
DALTON & KELLEY
Post Office Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Telephone: (801)583-2510

Steven K. Gordon (5958)
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000

Attorneys for National
Advertising Company

Attorneys for Gene V. Crawford
and Sherry T. Crawford

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

7

ARGUMENTS

9

I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
DISCRETION TO GRANT THE CRAWFORDS' MOTION
FOR LEAVE

9

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NAC BREACHED
THE LEASE WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

13

III.THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRAWFORDS
WERE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AGAINST NAC WAS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

15

CONCLUSION

16

ADDENDUM

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Atcitty v. San Juan School District, 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1998)

11

Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 27 (10th Cir. 1985)

12

Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971)

12

Glenn v. First National Bank, 868 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1989)

12

Harbor Ins. Co. v. Con. Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990)

9

Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1998)

11

Hill v. State Farm, 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 1992)

11

Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976)

1,
12

Pett v. A utoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2

1

Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84

1

Valley Disposal Inc. v. Central Vt.,\U F.3d 357 (2nd Cir. 1997)

11

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0)

1

Rules
URCP 13(d)

9

URCP 13(e)

10

URCP 59(e)

8,13,16

URCP 60(b)

8,13,16

URAP24(a)(ll)

17

FRCP 13(e)

9

iii

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court had jurisdiction or discretion to grant

defendants Gene V. and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords") leave to amend
their answer and state a counterclaim for damages. This first appears to be a
question of law that the Court reviews for correctness. Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d
231, 232 (Utah 1976) This second is a question that the Court reviews for abuse of
discretion. Pett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, f4, 106 P.3d 705 The issues were
preserved in the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Answer and Counterclaim (RR. 821); Reply to Amended Counterclaim
(RR. 846, 849); and Pretrial Order (RR. 887, 888, f 3).
2.

Whether the finding that plaintiff National Advertising Company

("NAC") breached the Standard Lease Agreement was clearly erroneous. Roderick
v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, %2, 54 P.3d 1119
3.

Whether the finding that the Crawfords were entitled to damages

against NAC was clearly erroneous. Roderick v. Ricks, supra

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed on October 4, 1996. (R. 1) The case went to summary
judgment for NAC on December 6, 1996. (R. 80) The Crawfords appealed (Case
No. 980238-CA), and the judgment was vacated because of questions about
service of process. (R. 387)
On remand, the trial court reversed its decision and entered summary
judgment for the Crawfords. (R. 675) The trial court resolved the service of
process issue, over NAC's objection (R. 568), on summary judgment. (R. 652)
NAC appealed (Case No. 2000085 0-C A), and the trial court decision was
reversed. (R. 686) This time, a trial was held on the service of process issue, and
the Crawfords prevailed. Judgment was entered for the Crawfords on August 2,
2002. (R. 796)
NAC appealed (Case No. 20020717-CA). This was the first time that the
Court of Appeals considered the case on the merits. The Crawfords prevailed (R.
811), and the case was remitted on December 15, 2003. (R. 809)
On December 23, 2003, the Crawfords filed a Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 814) For the first time in the
seven-year history of the case, the Crawfords made a damage claim against NAC.
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Their claim was for breach of contract, specifically, the Standard Lease
Agreement. The claim was that NAC breached the Lease by failing to remove its
outdoor advertising sign from the Crawfords' property. (RR. 838, 841)
Importantly, the claim was that NAC breached the Lease on October 23,
1996, which was the date on which the Crawfords claimed that the Lease had been
terminated. (R. 937,1fl|2-3) The Crawfords waited more than seven years, and
after full and final judgment, before making this claim.
The trial court granted the Motion (R. 835), and the case went to trial and
judgment for the Crawfords. (R. 934) Judgment was for all the sign income the
Crawfords claimed to have lost during the pendency of the case. (RR. 938, f4)
Specifically, this was from November, 1996 to May, 2003.
This ignored the fact thai NAC was the prevailing party in the case from
December 6, 1996 to August 28, 2000. NAC removed its sign from the
Crawfords' property once they became the prevailing parties (August 2, 2002). (R.
890, fin)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the facts supporting the disputed findings are contained in the
stipulated Pretrial Order. (R. 887) The rest come from the trial transcript and the
district court record:
3

On December 10, 1974, NAC entered into a Standard Lease Agreement with
the then owner of the Crawfords' property. (RR. 889a, 895) The Lease term began
on February 1, 1975 and had an initial term often years, followed by another tenyear term, and thereafter from year to year "until terminated as of any subsequent
anniversary of the effective date [February 1] by written notice of termination
given not less than sixty days prior to such anniversary date by either the Lessor or
Lessee." (R. 889d & e)
The Crawfords purchased the property in December, 1995. (R. 889c) Even
though the Lease was in the middle of a 1-year term, the Crawfords applied for an
outdoor advertising permit of their own. (RR. 60, %5 & 63) Murray City granted
the application and issued a "contingent" sign permit. (R. 890k) The permit "was
not to become effective unless and until [NAC's] sign was removed from the
Property." (R. 60, fl)
On April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified NAC that they were terminating
the Lease pursuant to ^[9. (RR. 890g) Paragraph 9 provides as follows:
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied
by the Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction
or remodeling, as evidenced by a building permit, requiring removal
of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate this Lease upon
giving the Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of termination,
together with a copy of the building permit,....
4

The Crawfords did not send a copy of the building permit. (R. 903)
Therefore, they followed the first notice with a notice dated June 10, 1996. (R.
890h) The June 10, 1996 notice stated: "A copy of the building permit for the
new development will be sent as soon as it is issued." (R. 905)
Brad Crawford testified that the building permit was faxed to NAC on July
25, 2003. (TR 9/1-7) Therefore, on August 7, 1996, Mr. Crawford sent a third
notice: "I have complied with all notification requirements as specified in
paragraph 9 of the Lease." (RR. 890i, 908)
Mr. Crawford went further: "I feel that as of August 3, 1996, all notification
requirements as specified in paragraph 9 of the Lease have been met. I also feel it
is quite clear that the 90 day notification period expired on July 29, 1996. This is
90 days after your receipt of notice on April 30, 1996. This means that National
Advertising Company is now illegally trespassing on my father[']s property." (R.
908)
Along with the August 7, 1996 notice, the Crawfords sent a copy of the
Master Site Plan "showing the proposed use of the area where the sign is located."
(R. 909) The Site Plan showed that NAC's sign covered four parking stalls in the
northwest corner of the property. (R. 910) In his testimony at trial, Mr. Crawford
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confirmed that the sign needed to be moved in order to accommodate those four
parking stalls. (TR 19/17-25, 20/1)
This did not mean that the sign had to be "removed" as required by the
Lease. In fact, the Master Site Plan shows that NAC's sign was not to be removed,
but to be "relocated" a few feet away. (R. 910) Mr. Crawford explained that the
architect is the one who wrote in: "New location for billboard sign (relocated)."
(TR/19/15-16) Mr. Crawford is the one who wrote in: "Existing sign (to be
removed)." (TR 19/11-13)
Mr. Crawford explained that once his parents acquired a sign permit of their
own, it was their intention to have NAC's sign removed from the property. (TR
20/15-20) The Crawfords did not want to own the sign, but they did intend to own
and control the sign permit. (TR 15/8-25) A new sign (owned by Star Media) is
located on the very spot marked out on the Master Site Plan. (TR 20/2-6)
Importantly, NAC was not told its sign could be "relocated" on the
Crawfords' property. (TR 20/11-25) There had been some discussion about
moving the sign nearly a year ago (TR 20/15-17), but none of the f9 termination
notices said anything about this. (RR. 903, 905, 908)
NAC could see (from the Site Plan) that the Crawfords' remodeling and
construction did not require "removal" of its sign. Therefore, it did not remove the
6

sign in response to the %9 notices. The Crawfords were not too certain about the
%9 termination because on November 25, 1996, they sent another notice stating
that the Lease would be terminated under ^3. (R. 890j) NAC honored this notice
and removed its sign at the end of the Lease term. (R. 890n)
NAC's sign was not in the way of the building. (R. 910) It was long gone
before construction got to the parking lot. (TR 24/15-24) Mr. Crawford testified
that the sign was in the way of the grading (TR 24/8-14), but he admitted that the
Crawfords suffered no damage as a result. (TR 27/7-18)
Even though NAC's sign was removed from the Crawfords' property at the
end of the Lease term, the Crawfords were prevented from erecting a sign of their
own because NAC had relocated its sign to the neighbor's property. (R. 8901-n)
Admittedly, this was "pursuant to the rulings of this Court and permits issued by
Murray City and the Utah Department of Transportation." (R. 8901)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The district court was without jurisdiction or discretion to grant the

Crawfords leave to amend their answer and state a counterclaim for damages. The
Crawfords waited to make their Motion until after the final judgment entered by
the district court had been affirmed by this Court on the third appeal. There is no
question that the Crawfords' counterclaim had "matured" by the time of the filing
7

of their original answer. The Crawfords never offered any explanation for their
late filing. They never moved to reopen the judgment under URCP 60(b) or 59(e).
2.

The trial court's finding that NAC breached f 9 of the Lease was

clearly erroneous. The Crawfords' construction and remodeling did not require
"removal" of NAC s sign. The Crawfords made provision for "relocating" the
sign on their property, but their intention was to replace NAC's sign with one of
their own. NAC was not required to remove its sign until the end of the Lease
term, which it did.
3.

The trial court's finding that the Crawfords were entitled to damages

against NAC was clearly erroneous. NAC's alleged breach of the Lease did not
cause the Crawfords any damages. They were prevented from erecting a sign
because of the permits issued to NAC by Murray City and the Utah Department of
Transportation. Those permits were issued as a result of a ruling by the district
court that NAC had the only valid sign permit.
//
//
//
//
//
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
DISCRETION TO GRANT THE CRAWFORDS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE.
The Crawfords' Motion was based on URCP 13(d). (R. 818) The Crawfords

did not claim that they "acquired" the claim after filing their original answer. They
claimed that it did not "mature" until after the third and final appeal. (R. 818)
No Utah case has defined "matured" as it is used in URCP 13(d). However,
13(d) is the substantial equivalent of FRCP 13(e). Federal cases are of some help.
One said that FRCP 13(e) applies to a claim that "could not have been filed
because it did not exist when the answer was due." Harbor Insurance Co. v.
Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1990)
This is not the case here. In the notice dated August 7, 1996, Brad Crawford
stated: "I feel that as of August 3, 1996, all notification requirements as specified
in paragraph 9 of the Lease have been met. I also feel it is quite clear that the 90
day notification period expired on July 29, 1996. This is 90 days after your receipt
of notice on April 30, 1996. This means that National Advertising is now illegally
trespassing on my father[']s property."
These statements leave nothing to the imagination. According to the
Crawfords, NAC was in breach of the Lease as early as July 29, 1996, but no later
9

than October 23, 1996: "Thus, National was required to remove its sign from the
Property by no later than October 23, 1996." (R. 937, f2)
Damages were awarded to the Crawfords "from November of 1996 to May
of 2003." (R. 938, %4) How could the Crawfords receive damages into 1996 if
their claim did not "exist" in 1996?
For their part, the Crawfords could only say: "If [we] had previously pled
the proposed counterclaim..., any proceedings on that claim would no doubt have
been stayed pending the outcome of the permit issue. Consequently, if [we] had
included the proposed counterclaim in [our] initial answer and counterclaim,
nothing would have happened on that claim until now." (R. 818 n.l)
This is no doubt true, but it does nothing to show whether the Crawfords'
counterclaim had "matured." Besides, the Crawfords' claim of permit invalidity
was not dependent on its claimed termination under ^[9 of the Lease. In the last of
the three appeals, this Court said that question was "ultimately irrelevant to our
decision." (Memorandum Decision, Case No. 20020717-CA)
The Crawfords' Motion was also based on URCP 13(e), but this position
was even worse. The Crawfords gave no reason why the Motion was not filed
earlier except for the erroneous claim of lack of "maturity." (R. 818)
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The court in Valley Disposal Inc. v. Central Vermont Solid Waste
Management District, 113 F.3d 357 (2nd Cir. 1997) said that:
A belated motion to file [a counterclaim] may properly be denied
where the delay is lengthy or where there is no reasonable explanation
for the failure to assert it, or to make the motion, earlier. See, e.g.,
Crown Life Insurance Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 35
F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming refusal to allow a
counterclaim first asserted by defendant three months after the district
court granted summary judgment for plaintiff); Imperial Enterprises,
Inc. v. Firemanrs Fund Insurance Co., 535 F.2d 287, 293 (5th Cir.
1976) (same where defendant "was aware of the facts underlying its
alleged counterclaim for almost a year before it made its motion");
Kirbens v. Wodis, 295 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1961) (same where
request to assert counterclaim for a setoff was made after entry of
judgment for plaintiff though the defendant could have asserted the
claim at least two and one-half years earlier).
113F.3dat365

In opposition to the Motion, NAC cited the following Utah cases in which
the decision to deny a motion to leave was affirmed: Atcitty v. San Juan County
School District, 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1998) (motion filed two and a half
months after the discovery cut-off); Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah
App. 1998) (motion filed after discovery cut-off and summary judgment); Hill v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 1992) (motion
filed six years into the litigation, by which time, summary judgment had been
granted, and case was back from appeal to the Utah Supreme Court).
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These cases show that the trial court never should have exercised discretion
(assuming it had discretion) to consider the Crawfords' Motion. For their part, the
only legal authority cited by the Crawfords was Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045
(Utah 1971). The two cases could not be more different.
Gillman involved an automobile accident, and defendant was represented by
insurance defense counsel. Counsel did not meet with defendant until just before
her deposition, which was the first taken in the case. At the meeting, insurance
defense counsel realized that defendant had a counterclaim. The motion for leave
to assert a counterclaim was made right after defendant's deposition.
Before the deposition, the parties had exchanged some interrogatories and
made certain motions. However, the case was not scheduled for trial. There is
nothing like that here. The Crawfords waited until after two trials and a third and
final appeal before making their Motion.
In its Memorandum in Opposition, NAC also cited Nichols v. State, supra:
"Utah has adopted the majority rule that an order of dismissal is a final
adjudication, and thereafter, the plaintiff must move under Rules 59(e) or 60(b) to
reopen the judgment." 554 P.2d at 232
This is also the federal rule, Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 27, 29 (10th Cir.
1985); Glenn v. First National Bank, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989) It says
12

that after entry of the final judgment (August 2, 2002), the Crawfords were
required to reopen the judgment before moving for leave to amend.
These cases hold that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider
the Crawfords' Motion for Leave without reopening the judgment under URCP
60(b) or 59(e). Either way, the Crawfords' Motion never should have been
granted.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NAC BREACHED THE
LEASE WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Without a claimed breach of duty, there is no basis for a damage claim. The

Crawfords left no question that the alleged breach of ^[9 was the basis for their
damage claim. (R. 937, ^[16) The parties stipulated that NAC removed its sign at
the end of the Lease term. (R. 890n)
The facts concerning this claim are not in dispute: After buying the property
in December, 1995, the Crawfords decided that they wanted to own the sign
permit. Therefore, on March 5, 1995, the Crawfords applied to Murray City for a
sign permit of their own. The sign permit was contingent on removal of NAC s
existing sign, but the Lease did not end until February 1, 1997. Therefore, the only
way for the Crawfords to get NAC to remove its sign, before the end of the Lease
term, was under ^[9.
13

Paragraph 9 is conditioned on permanent construction or remodeling
requiring "removal" of NAC s sign. The Master Site Plan produced by the
Crawfords showed that NAC's sign blocked four parking spaces. There is no
question that NAC's sign had to be moved, and allowance was made for its
"relocation" a few feet away. However, the Crawfords did not say anything about
this in any of the three notices they sent trying to terminate the Lease under ^}9.
The Crawfords wanted NAC to remove its sign so that their permit would become
effective. As a result, NAC would have been precluded from replacing the sign on
the Crawfords' property or on the neighbor's property. The Crawfords' new sign
was placed in the very spot identified in the Master Site Plan.
It is natural that the Lease would condition early termination on permanent
construction or remodeling requiring "removal" of the sign. If the sign could be
moved somewhere else on the property, there would be no need to terminate the
Lease before the end of its normal term. The Crawfords' interpretation of %9 was
too narrow. The trial court obviously adopted this interpretation. The trial court's
finding was clearly erroneous.
Even though NAC did not remove its sign until the end of the Lease term, it
did not interfere with construction of the parking spaces. NAC's sign was long
gone by the time construction got to the parking lot. Brad Crawford testified that
14

the sign was in the way of the grading work, but he admitted that the Crawfords
suffered no damage as a result, which leads to the final point.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRAWFORDS WERE
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AGAINST NAC WAS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
The Crawfords were never able to demonstrate that NAC's presumed breach

of f 9 caused them any damage. Even if they were right about the interpretation of
f 9, they did not have an actionable claim because what caused them the loss was
not the breach of f9, but the issuance of a competing sign permit to NAC. This is
evident from the undisputed findings of the trial court:
Despite receiving the fl[9] Notices, [NAC] did nol remove its
sign from the Property. Instead, [NAC] obtained a competing
permit.. .and erected the Sign [on the neighbor's property]. By doing
so, [NAC] precluded the Crawfords from: (a) allowing another entity
to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property; and (b)
collecting a monthly rental fee from that entity. The Crawfords were
precluded from doing so until May of2003.
(R. 937, f 16) (emphasis added)

The alleged breach of the Lease had nothing to do with this. This is evident
from the stipulated facts in the Pretrial Order:
[NAC] obtained its Permit on a neighboring parcel of property
and erected an outdoor advertising sign pursuant to the rulings of this
Court and permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of
Transportation.
15

(R. 8901) (emphasis added)
This is perhaps the most important point in the case, and it bears repeating:
NAC never would have erected a sign on the Crawfords' neighbor's property
except for permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of
Transportation. These entities never would have issued their permits except for the
ruling from the trial court that NAC was the prevailing party and had the only valid
sign permit. Once the Crawfords became the prevailing parties in the litigation,
NAC removed its sign from the neighbor's property.
Therefore, it does not matter whether NAC breached the Lease. The
Crawfords did not suffer any damage as a result.
CONCLUSION
The trial court never should have considered the Crawfords' Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. After the third appeal
to this Court, the judgment was final. The only way for the Crawfords to make
such a motion was to reopen the judgment under URCP 60(b) or 59(e). They
never did.
Assuming the trial court had discretion to consider the Crawfords' Motion, it
abused that discretion by permitting the Crawfords to assert a counterclaim for
16

damages after the case had proceeded to final judgment. There is no question that
the counterclaim was "mature" at the time of the filing of the original answer.
There is no question that the Crawfords were aware of the basis for the
counterclaim from the beginning of the case. They simply failed to raise it and
never offered a valid explanation for the late filing of their Motion.
NAC did not breach ^|9 of the Lease. The Crawfords' remodeling and
construction did not require "removal" of NAC s sign. The Crawfords made plans
for "relocation" of the sign within a few feet of its existing location. Their plans
were for someone other than NAC to replace the sign. That way, they could share
in the advertising revenue, which was their right, but not until the end of the Lease
term.
No matter what the Court concludes on the ^[9 issue, breach of the Lease did
not cause the Crawfords any damage. They were prevented from erecting a sign
on their property by the sign permits issued to NAC by Murray City and UDOT.
Those permits never would have been issued except for the ruling by the district
court that NAC had the only valid sign permit. Once the Crawfords became the
prevailing parties in the litigation, NAC removed its sign.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment for the Crawfords (R. 934) should be
REVERSED.
17

DATED this ^ i ^ d a y of May, 2005.
DALTON & KELLEY

^iki—

Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the within and
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Steven K. Gordon
Durham, Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Robert C. Keller
Williams & Hunt
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City UT 84145-5678
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Steve K. Gordon (5958)
DURHAM JONES & P1NEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V.
and Sherry T. Crawford

Donald L. Dalton (4305)
DALTON & KELLY
2458 Sunnyside Avenue
P.O. Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Telephone: (803) 583-2510
Attorney for Plaintiff National
Advertising Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff,

PRETRIAL ORDER
Civil No. 960906952CV

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD,
SHERRY T CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV,
L.L.C.
Defendants.

Judge Dennis J. Frederick

1.

JURISDICTION. Jurisdiction is not contested and is found to exist.

2.

VENUE. Venue is not contested and is found to be proper.

3.

NATURE OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES.
This case involves two competing permits for the construction of an outdoor advertising

sign. The first (the "Crawfords' Permit") was issued to Gene and Sherry Crawford (the
"Crawfords"). The second ("National's Permit") was subsequently issued to National
Advertising Company ("National"). One permit had to be invalidated because Murray's zoning

ordinances preclude the existence of both. This Court previously ruled that the Crawfords'
Permit is valid and that National's Permit is null and void. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.
The remaining claims are contained in the Crawfords' Second Amended Answer and
Counterclaim. The Crawfords contend that National failed/refused to remove its sign from the
Property in accordance with the Notices and the Lease, and instead wrongfully obtained a
competing permit and erected the Sign, thereby precluding the Crawfords from erecting their
own sign on the Property. The Crawfords argue Nationals' conduct constitutes a breach of the
Lease, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Lease, a trespass,
and/or an unlawful detainer.
National's denials and defenses, which are contained in its Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim ("National's Opposing
Memo") and Reply to Amended Counterclaim ("National's Reply"), are as follows: (1) National
complied with all provisions of the Lease and breached no duty to the Crawfords; (2) the
damages claimed by the Crawfords were the result of actions taken by National in compliance
with this Court's rulings and permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of
Transportation; (3) the Amended Counterclaim is barred by URCP 59(e) and 60(b), because
under Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), the Crawfords had "to reopen the judgment"
before moving to amend and the time for doing so had run; (4) Utah does not recognize a claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)); (5) Utah does not recognize a claim for unjust enrichment
where there is an enforceable written or oral contract (see Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah

2

App. 1987)); and (6) there is no claim for unlawful detainer in the absence of prior notice to the
alleged detainer.
4.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
a.

In December of 1974, National entered into a lease (the "Lease") which allowed it

to construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at approximately
4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the "Property").
b.

On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords granted their son, Brad Crawford, a general

power of attorney
c.

In December of 1995, Brad Crawford purchased the Property on behalf of his

parents, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor under the Lease.
d.

Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall commence on February 1,

1975, and continue for ten years.
e.

Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall continue for an additional

ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by the Lessor as of any subsequent
anniversary of the Lease upon at least sixty days written notice.
f.

Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides:

In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the Lessee's
displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, as evidenced
by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor
may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of
termination, together with a copy of the building permit, by registered mail to
either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the
Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion
of this Lease beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its
displays within the 90 day period.
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g.

Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified

National that its sign must be removed from the Property.
h.

As of June 10, 1996, National had not removed its sign.

On that date, the

Crawfords notified National a second time that its sign must be removed from the Property.
i.

As of August 7, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the

Crawfords notified National a third time that its sign must be removed from the Property. The
April 23, 1996 notice, the June 10, 1996 notice and the August 7, 1996 notice will hereinafter be
referred to as (the "Notices").
j.

On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been

terminated pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, the Crawfords notified National in writing,
pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, that the Lease would be terminated as of February 1, 1997,
the next anniversary date.
k.

On March 29, 1996, Murray City issued to the Crawfords^ Permit.

I.

Subsequently, National obtained its Permit on a neighboring parcel of property

and erected an outdoor advertising sign (the "Sign") pursuant to the rulings of this Court and
permits issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of Transportation.
m.

On August 2, 2002, this Court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit is valid and that

National's Permit is null and void. That ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in a
Memorandum Decision dated October 9, 2003.
n.

National erected the Sign on the neighbor's property in February of 1997. The

Sign remained up until September of 2002.
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5.

DISPUTED FACTS
The Crawfords contend that despite receiving the Notices, National: (1) failed and/or

refused to remove its sign from the Property in accordance with the Notices and the Lease; (2)
instead wrongfully obtained a competing permit (which has been invalidated) and erected the
Sign; (3) thereby precluding the Crawford's from erecting their own sign on the Property and
from collecting advertising revenue until May of 2003.
6.

CONTESTED ISSUE OF LAW
a.

Whether National failed and/or refused to remove its sign from the Property in

accordance with the Notices and the Lease, and instead obtained a competing permit (which has
been invalidated) and erected the Sign, thereby precluding the Crawfords from erecting their own
sign on the Property.
b.

If the answer to the question posed in paragraph 6(a) is "yes," whether National's

conduct constitutes: (1) a breach of the Lease; (2) a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied in the Lease; (3) a trespass; and/or (4) an unlawful detainer.
c.

If the answer to the question posed in paragraph 6(b) is "yes:" (1) what is the

correct measure of damages; and (2) must National disgorge all advertising revenue it has
received in connection with the Sign.
7.

EXHIBITS
A joint set of Exhibits is attached as Exhibit A. The parties have stipulated to the

authenticity, relevance and materiality of these exhibits.
8.

WITNESSES

5

a.

The Crawfords will call Brad Crawford and any witnesses called by National.

b.

National may call Steve Christiansen and Monte Merrill, and any witnesses called

by the Crawfords.
9.

DISCOVERY. Discovery is complete.

10.

TRIAL SETTING. A bench trial is set for a one day on October 19, 2004.

11.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. The possibility of settlement is poor.
DATED October j l , 2004.

Approved

Donald L. Dalton
Attorney for National Advertising Company

Steve K. Gordon
Attorney for the Crawfofds
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Judge J. Dennis Frederick
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, GENE
V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T.
CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, L.L.C.
Defendants

This case involves two competing permits for outdoor advertising signs issued by Murray
City Corporation ("Murray"). The first (the "Crawfords* Permit") was issued to defendants Gene
V. Crawford and Sherry Crawtord, dba Vai-Uev, L.L.C. (collectively "the Crawfords"). The
second ("National's Permit") was subsequently issued to plaintiff National Advertising Company
("National"). Only one permit can be valid under Murray's zoning ordinances. This Court
previously validated the Crawfords' Permit. The remaining claims are contained in the
Crawfords' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim.
The Court held a bench trial on these claims on October 19, 2004. Steve K. Gordon of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law & Order <®J

Durham Jones & Pinegar represented the Crawfords. Donald L. Dalton of Dalton & Kelley
represented National. The Court has considered the pleadings submitted by the parties, the
testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits accepted into evidence, and the arguments of counsel.
Having done so, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
L

In December of 1974, National executed a lease (the "Lease") which allowed it, as

lessee, to construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the "Property"). See
Exhibit A.
2.

On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords granted their son, Brad Crawford, a general

power of attorney.
3.

In December of 1995, Brad Crawford purchased the Property on his parents'

behalf, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor under the Lease.
4.

The initial term of the Lease was from February 1, 1975 to January 31, 1985. See

Exhibit A at ^[3.
5.

Subsequently, the Lease continued for an additional ten years, and thereafter from

year to year, unless terminated by the lessor as of February 1 of any subsequent year upon at least
sixty days written notice. See id.
6.

Paragraph 9 of the Lease states:

In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the Lessee's
displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, as evidenced
by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor
may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of
termination, together with a copy of the building permit, by registered mail to
either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the
Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion
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of this Lease beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its
displays within the 90 day period.
7.

Pursuant to paragraph 9, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified National that

its sign must be removed from the Property (the "April 23 Notice").
8.

On June 10, 1996, the Crawfords notified National a second time that its sign

must be removed from the Property (the "June 10 Notice").
9.

On July 25, 1996, the Crawfords delivered to National a copy of the building

permit for the construction referenced in the April 23 Notice and the June 10 Notice (the
"Building Permit").
10.

On August 7, 1996, the Crawfords notified National a third time that its sign must

be removed from the Property (the "August 7 Notice"). The April 23 Notice, the June 10 Notice
and the August 7 Notice are referred to collectively as the "Notices."
11.

On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been

terminated pursuant to paragraph 9, the Crawfords notified National in writing that the Lease
would be terminated effective February 1, 1997 at the latest, pursuant to paragraph 3.
12.

On March 29, 1996, Murray issued the Crawfords' Permit.

13.

Subsequently, Murray issued National's Permit and National erected an outdoor

advertising sign on property adjacent to the Property ( the "Sign").
14.

Murray's zoning ordinances preclude the existence of both signs. On August 2,

2002, this Court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit is valid and that National's Permit is "null and
void." That ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in a Memorandum Decision dated
October 9, 2003.
15.

The Sign was erected in February of 1997 and remained until September of 2002.
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16.

Despite receiving the Notices, National did not remove its sign from the Property.

Instead, National obtained a competing permit (which has been ruled to be "null and void") and
erected the Sign. By doing so, National precluded the Crawfords from: (a) allowing another
entity to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property; and (b) collecting a monthly rental fee
from that entity. The Crawfords were precluded from doing so until May of 2003.
17.

Since May of 2003, the Crawfords have: (a) allowed another entity to erect an

outdoor advertising sign on the Property pursuant to an outdoor advertising lease (the "Second
Lease"); and (b) collected monthly rental payments of approximately $1,050 per month pursuant
to the Second Lease.
18.

The Crawfords were ready, willing and able to enter into the Second Lease as of

November of 1996, but were precluded from doing so by National's failure to remove its sign
from the Property in accordance with the Notices and paragraph 9 of the Lease.
19.

Each finding of fact that may be construed to be a conclusion of law shall be so

construed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Crawfords satisfied all prerequisites for terminating the Lease pursuant to

paragraph 9, and properly terminated the Lease, by providing National with: (1) the April 23 Notice;
(2) the June 10 Notice; and (3) a copy of the Building Permit on July 25, 1996.
2.

Pursuant to paragraph 9, National was required to remove its sign from the Property

within 90 days of receiving written notice of termination and a copy of the building permit. Thus,
National was required to remove its sign from the Property by no later than October 23,1996.
3.

National breached the Lease, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

by not removing its sign from the Property by October 23, 1996.
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4.

As a result of National's breach of the Lease, and the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, the Crawfords were precluded from entering into the Second Lease, and receiving
the monthly payment of $1,050 under the Second Lease, from November of 1996 to May of 2003.
Consequently, National's breach of the Lease damaged the Crawfords by depriving them of 78
monthly rental payments of $1,050, for a total of $81,900.
5.

Each conclusion of law that may be construed to be a finding of fact shall be so

construed.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court enters judgment for the Crawfords and against National
in the amount of $81,900, plus prejudgment interest of $27,732.91 (from November 1, 1996 to
October 25, 2004 [the date of the Court's minute entry] at the rate of 10% pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 154-1(2)), for a total of $109,632.91, plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 3.38%
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3).

Approved:

Donald L. Dalton
Attorney for Plaintiff

